one factor. And it's given outsized credit by some historians - particularly those on the USG payroll. Yes, it was important, but I dunno if it is at the top of the list wrt to the eastern front.

LL supplied relatively few frontline pieces of equipment to the Soviet Army. The Brits were the primary benefactor of LL, not the Soviets.

The article you provide is typical of RFE - it's not incorrect, but it is USG propaganda. The quote from Stalin is diplomatic eyewash taken in the middle of the war at a conference aimed at cementing allied cooperation; so it must be taken in context. It was not a time where the Soviets would not have praised the U.S, any more than Roosevelt or Churchill would have called them a bunch of dirty commies or inquired of ol' Joe, as to why he was killing millions of his own citizenry. And Khrushchev's quote is typical of Khrushchev's un-Soviet diplomacy - it's tough to make out where he is coming from a lot of the time.

And while 14,000 aircraft may seem like a lot, the article again doesn't put it in context. In the same amount of time, the Soviets produced over 150k aircraft in the Urals and elsewhere. They produced more T-34 tanks than we did M4 Shermans - and the T-34, while somewhat crude, was much more effective against German armor.  Like the T-34, the Shturmovik was much more effective on the eastern front than the P-39s or P-63s provided under LL to the Soviet AF.

Where LL had its greatest effect was as a public/diplomatic show of force that also bolstered Soviet logistics, and provided needed raw materials and money. That was definitely important.

I remain unconvinced that its effect was greater than German strategic blunders, including the planning of Barbarossa where success was predicated on the capitulation and surrender of the Soviet Army (especially stupid when one considers the Soviets probably had well over 100 divisions in reserve at points east of Moscow, while the U.S. never had over 100 divisions total during WWII).

In my opinion, LL did not have a greater effect than the Germans fighting a two-front war, particularly when the Wehrmacht had to do things like fortifying the Gustav Line, thereby diverting troops and also creating a constant preoccupation with the invasion of France that they knew was coming.

And finally, the reality is that the Soviets had so many men to throw into the breach of a grinding, defensive battle where civilians also became combatants. The idea that quality training and/or equipment was overcome by sheer hordes of troops was often the order of the day, and proved true in many instances.  The Soviets fielded 25% more divisions than the Germans, and theirs weren't scattered all over Europe and North Africa.

And there is one other thing that is, admittedly, complete conjecture on my part; and it has something to do with the defensive nature of the war for the Soviets. Russian history shows an incredibly resilient (albeit often brutal) populace, and one that is accustomed to and even accepting of extreme hardship - even today. They seem to take it in stride. I have a tough time discounting that this did not play an outsized role in the defense of the Soviet Union.